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Abstract: Current models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) tend to focus on
the mechanisms underlying their occurrence, but often fail to address the content of the
auditory experience. In other words, they tend to ask why there are AVHs at all, instead
of asking why, given that there are AVHs, they have the properties that they have. One
such property, which has been largely overlooked and which we will focus on here, is
why the voices are often experienced as coming from (or being the voices of) agents, and
often specific, individualised agents. In this article, we argue not only that the represen-
tation of agents is important in accurately describing many cases of AVH, but also that
deeper reflection on what is involved in the representation of agents has potentially vital
consequences for our aetiological understanding of AVH, namely, for understanding how
and why AVHs come about.
Introduction
Current aetiological models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) tend to focus
on the mechanisms underlying their occurrence, but often fail to address more
fine-grained aspects of the content of the auditory experience. In other words, they
tend to ask why there are AVHs at all, instead of asking, given that there are AVHs,
why they have the properties that they have. One such property, which has been
largely overlooked and which we will focus on here, is why the voices are often
experienced as coming from (or being the voices of) agents, and often specific,
individualised agents.
In this article, we argue not only that the representation1 of agents is important
in accurately describing many cases of AVH, but also that deeper reflection on what
is involved in the representation of agents has potentially vital consequences for our
aetiological understanding of AVH, namely, for understanding how and why AVHs
come about.
We proceed as follows. We begin by outlining the importance that the representa-
tion of agents has in AVHs.We explain that there are degrees of agent representation,
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and distinguish the representation of agency from the representation of agent iden-
tity (namely representing a specific, numerically unique agent). We then address,
in turn, the representation of agency (Section 2) and the representation of specific
agents (Section 3), asking three questions for each: What is it to represent agents and
specific agents? Why (in the teleological sense, viz. to what end) do we represent
agents and specific agents? When do we represent agents and specific agents in per-
ception? We end by reflecting on the consequences that answers to these questions
have for our understanding of AVH.
1. The Centrality of Agent Representation in AVH
In this section, we examine the importance of agent representation in AVH. We
show how current aetiologies haven’t really taken it into account, either as an
explanans or as an explanandum. We then give two reasons for not placing, as many
theorists do, the explanatory emphasis on the sensory aspects of AVH.
1.1 Current Aetiological Models of AVH
Current aetiological models of AVH tend to address the question of how it is that
AVH can occur at all, rather than addressing issues about what is experienced. Such
models include ones that take the experience to arise as a result of misattributed inner
speech (e.g. Frith, 1992; Fernyhough 2004), intrusions from memory (e.g. Badcock
et al., 2005), or even just spontaneous activation in auditory cortex (Cho and Wu,
2013). Here we do not want to support or criticise any of these models but focus on
an aspect of AVHs that they tend to overlook, namely, the representation of agents.
We want to suggest that the representation of agents needs to be taken into
account, not only for accurately describing many cases of AVH, but also for help-
ing us understand why they come about. Now, proponents of these models might
claim that agents are represented in AVHs because AVHs ‘sound’ like they come
from agents or specific agents. Therefore, accounting for the presence of AVHs, qua
hallucinatory sensory experiences, has explanatory primacy over the representation
of agency in AVH. We want to suggest that an alternative explanatory emphasis is
potentially illuminating.
1.2 Taking the ‘Voice’ Out of ‘Voice Hearing’
The representation of agents is not only central to describing many cases of AVHs,
it is also bound up in how both patients and clinicians talk about AVH.
Just to take a revealing illustration of this; voice-hearers are often asked (whether in
person or in questionnaires), ‘Howmany voices do you hear?’ A moment’s reflection
on the meaning of ‘voices’ in this question tells us that this is not asking: ‘How
many times do you have the auditory experience of a (sound that is like a) human
voice talking to you?’ It is rather asking a question about how many potentially
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distinguishable individuals the subject hears talking to her. A ‘voice’ here does not
mean what it does when you might say, ‘That synthesiser has a setting that produces
a voice’ or even ‘James has a beautiful voice’. ‘Voice’, in this context, is bound to a
specific agent that can have major significance to the voice-hearing subject.2
These agents can be represented with a differing degree of depth (i.e. the sub-
ject’s conception of them can be very rich or very sparse), however, many of them
persist over time, and sometimes over the course of years or even decades (Hartigan
et al., 2013). Furthermore, these agents are most often perceived as making coher-
ent communicative speech acts (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014) and are experienced
as interacting with the voice-hearer. Indeed, over 80% of voice-hearers report being
able to engage in interactive conversations with their voices (Leudar et al., 1997;
Garret and Silva, 2003). As Hayward et al. (2011) note, voice-hearers often interact
with their voices in ways that ‘share many properties with interpersonal relation-
ships within the social world’ (p. 1320). With all of this in mind, it seems clear that
the agents represented in experiences of AVH are often central to the phenomena.
Indeed we might say that overlooking the role of agency in auditory hallucinations
is, in some cases, tantamount to taking the ‘voice’ out of ‘voice hearing’.
1.3 Degrees of Agent Representation in AVH
Experience of AVHs can be varied and although the subjective experience of agen-
tive voices occurs in the majority of voice-hearers (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014)
not every case represents agents in the way that interests us here. There are degrees
of agent-representation in AVH, and it is important to clarify that some auditory
hallucinatory experiences are not the subject of this article. We start with the lowest
level of agent representation, namely, an absence of it, and work our way up to the
richest agent representations in AVHs.
1.3.1 Absent Agency. First of all, there are cases of auditory hallucinations that
aren’t vocal in anyway. Tinnitus is perhaps the most common example (typically
consisting of whistling or white noise-like sounds), but non-vocal auditory hallu-
cinations can also include the experience of clicks, bangs, horns and, at the more
complex end, music (Nayani and David, 1996). However, it’s important to note that
just because a hallucination isn’t voice-like, it doesn’t mean that agency is automati-
cally not represented. Van Putten and Emory’s (1973) case report of a military veteran
who experienced hallucinations of enemy footsteps would be an example of one
such non-vocal hallucination represented as agentive. Conversely, it is not incon-
ceivable that something could sound qualitatively voice-like, but with no agency
attached to it.
2 Using this sense of ‘voice’, it is not a contradiction to say: ‘The voice [the agent] has changed
its voice [the sound]’.
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It is not clear to what extent there can be totally agentless voices, since, to the
extent that something is speech, a communicative intention of some sort is arguably
required to disambiguate it. The closest thing we might get are cases where an audi-
tory experience that resembles a human voice is heard, but there is no perceived
communicative intention on the part of the hearer. For example, Yoshizumi et al.
(2004) report experiences of hallucinated screams and groans; in cases of palina-
cousis, patients can hear the last word or section of a phrase ‘echoed’ (Jacobs et al.,
1973) and in thought echo, patients hear their thoughts ‘spoken out loud’ a frac-
tion of a second after they have thought them (David, 1994). Nayani and David
(1996) report a patient who had the auditory hallucination of ‘the murmur of a
crowd’ but with only group agency being represented and seemingly no experience
of individual agency.
1.3.2 Agency Without Individuation. Other cases where agency, but not any
distinguishable agent, is represented, are in what Dodgson and Gordon (2009) call
‘hypervigilance’ hallucinations. In one case study that they use to illustrate these,
a patient who is worried that others think that he is a paedophile hears ‘nonce!’
shouted at him throughout the day. There is no indication that he represents this as
coming from a specific person, or that, on two separate instances, he can even ask
himself whether it comes from the same or a different person. However, it is clear
that there is a communicative intention and that the subject takes the experienced
utterance to be directed at him.
1.3.3 Internally Individualised Agency. One step up from this is when the
agency that is represented in a given case, is bound to a specific agent in the mind of
the voice-hearer over time. Voices may be associated with agents identifiable by indi-
vidual characteristics but without any nominative reference—such as those experi-
enced by patients who referred to their seemingly anonymous voices as ‘unknown
old woman’ or ‘a man with a deep voice’ in the study of Leudar et al (1997) who
labels them ‘incognito voices’. Voices may also be given an idiosyncratic or purely
internally referenced name. For example, the ‘demonic’ ‘Simon’ and the ‘little boy’
‘Jeremy’ described by a patient from Knudson and Coyle (2002).
1.3.4 Externally Individualised Agency. Finally, voice hearers sometimes asso-
ciate their voice experiences with specific identities from the ‘outside world’. These
‘pre-existing’ identities can include past or current family members, acquaintances or
celebrities—or indeed fictional or non-corporeal individuals from popular culture
or religion (Beavan, 2011).
1.3.5 Recap. To sum up, then, we can isolate at least four levels of agent-representation
in AVHs.
1) Absent or functionally absent agency
2) Agency without individualisation
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3) Internally individualised identity (anonymous ‘incognito voices’ or those
given purely internally generated names)
4) Externally individualised identity (whether fictional or real)
It is important to note that types 3 and 4 make up the vast majority of reported
voice hearing experiences (Bell, 2013). Indeed, Corstens and Longden (2013)
recently reported that representation of an individualised agent could be formulated
in 80% of clinical voice hearers.3
1.4 Agency and Sensory Quality
Many theorists put minimal emphasis on agent representation in AVHs, perhaps
because they assume that the agency and individual agents represented are built
out of the auditory qualities, and so the latter is what really needs explaining. For
example, Cho and Wu (2013, p. 2) claim that ‘it is simple to explain why the patient
misattributes the event to another person: that is what it sounds like’. According to
such a view, I hear the voice of, e.g., my stepfather because my auditory experience
has the properties that resemble those of my stepfather’s voice. Of course, one prob-
lem with this is that, even if this is an accurate account, we need to explain why
the experience has those properties and not others. Furthermore, in spite of this
explanatory challenge, there are some voice-hallucination experiences for which
this cannot be the correct account.
1.4.1 Soundless Voices. Many theorists highlight the fact that AVHs have sen-
sory qualities that are similar to hearing.4 Garrett and Silva (2003, p. 445), state
that ‘the subjective quality of sensation is a near-universal feature of auditory hal-
lucinations’ and Cho and Wu (2013, p. 2) note that ‘patients reflecting on the
phenomenology of AVH typically report strong acoustical properties that are typi-
cally characteristic of hearing another person’s voice’. Nevertheless, this experience
is by no means universal. For example, Frith (1992, p. 73) maintains that AVHs
can involve something more abstract than hearing a voice, ‘an experience of receiv-
ing a communication without any sensory component’. Moritz and Larøi (2008,
p. 104) suggest that the term ‘voice-hearing’ may well be a ‘misnomer’, an ‘inac-
curate term to express that their cognitions are not their own’. The phenomenon of
‘ “soundless voices” have’ been reported as far back as Janet (1889/1973) and Bleuler
(1911/1950) and has been widely discussed since (Jones, 2010; Larøi et al., 2012).
Janet’s early account is illustrative:
It speaks to me all the time, said one of them, it told me that it is necessary to
go and ask the Pope for a pardon.—Do you know who speaks to you?—No,
3 Many thanks to an anonymous referee, for drawing our attention to this recent paper.
4 Of course, these theorists might be stipulating that by AVHs, they only mean those experiences
that have auditory phenomenology.
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I don’t recognise it, it is not the voice of anybody.—The voice is it far or
near?—It is neither far nor near, one would say that it is in my chest.—Is it
like a voice?—Not really, it is not a voice, I do not hear anything, I sense that
I am spoken to.
In terms of systematic studies, a recent questionnaire study conducted by one
our teams, filled in by voice-hearers from clinical and non-clinical populations,
found a large number of cases where voices where sometimes or always reported
as non-auditory. Here is one example:
It’s hard to describe how I could ‘hear’ a voice that wasn’t auditory; but the words
used and the emotions they contained (hatred and disgust) were completely clear,
distinct and unmistakeable, maybe evenmore so than if I had heard them aurally.5
It seems clear that subjects can undergo profound experiences of being spoken
to, or communicated with, without the presence of any auditory phenomenology.
1.4.2 ‘Voice’ Hallucinations in Deaf Subjects. Another very powerful reason
why it is important not to view AVHs as exhausted by the qualitative features of the
auditory experience, and by that same token, to attach greater importance to the
representation of agency, concerns data from ‘voice-hallucinations’ in congenitally
deaf patients with psychosis. According to Atkinson (2006, pp. 702–3): ‘Around half
of all deaf people diagnosed with schizophrenia report experiencing “voices,” during
which they sense someone communicating with them in the absence of any external
stimulus’. A qualitative interview by du Feu and McKenna (1999) suggested that the
voice hallucinations, even of those born profoundly deaf, had an auditory quality.
However, Atkinson convincingly argues against this, suggesting that this is merely
the result of the ‘audiocentric way in which interrogative questions are often framed
during research interviews’ (p. 702). In fact, Thacker (1994), approvingly cited in
Atkinson (2006), reports that questions about more specific acoustical properties
of hallucinated voices are met with responses such as ‘How do I know? I’m deaf!’
Thacker instead reports cases where individuals ‘claimed they were lip-reading a
vague visual percept, but could not clearly see a face, or who felt that they were
being finger-spelled to by a persecutor but were unable to see the hands distinctly’
(Atkinson, 2006, p. 703). She also suggests that, in some cases, the hallucination is
best described as a ‘message’ or ‘communication’ hallucination, where the subject
can tell what is said, but without there being any sensory component at all (compare
with Frith, 1992, p. 73, quoted above: ‘an experience of receiving a communication
without any sensory component’).
5 This questionnaire was conducted online as part of theWellcome Trust funded project ‘Hearing
the Voice’ and ethically approved by the Durham University Philosophy Department Research
Committee. Participants were asked to provide free text responses to several questions about
voices and voice-like experiences.
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If it is impossible for congenitally deaf subjects to have ‘auditory’ voice hallucina-
tions, this impossibility could be due to different things (which would correspond
to a weaker and a stronger sense of ‘impossible’). In the strongest sense, this impos-
sibility would be due to the inability (perhaps due to recruitment of auditory brain
regions for other roles) of congenitally deaf subjects to have any auditory experiences
at all. In the weaker case, this could be due to the mechanisms of AVHs needing to
recruit modality-specific imagery, (or that the AVH is associated with such imagery),
where auditory imagery in particular is unavailable to the congenitally profoundly
deaf (and so visual and motoric imagery need to be recruited instead). Either way,
a purely auditory view of voice hallucinations is deeply damaged by this data from
congenitally deaf subjects. The experience of being communicated with by an agent,
who is represented at least to some degree, seems central to these cases.
1.4.3 Voices Without Recognisable Sensory Qualities. One further diffi-
culty with the view that voices are identified as agents because they have the sensory
properties that resemble those agents, is that many people experience voices for
which no clear sensory properties can be assumed. Voices might commonly be expe-
rienced as non-human agents (the voice of spirits, angels, devils and so on) where
agent representations are unlikely to be built out of relevant auditory qualities since
none exist.6 Although one could make a weak claim that some sensory properties
are assumed in popular culture (e.g. the ‘booming’ voice of God) this is unlikely to
be sufficient to account for the process of inferring such a specific agent and nei-
ther does it conform to what we know about these experiences which tend to be
idiosyncratic in their sensory qualities (e.g. Dein and Littlewood, 2007).
1.5 Our Claim
What we want to claim is the following: We have a natural propensity to represent
agents generally, and, in certain circumstances, we have a propensity to represent spe-
cific, re-identifiable agents. Understanding this helps us to explain certain important
features of AVH. In Section 2 we examine, first, the representation of agents generally.
Then, in Section 3, we examine the representation of specific individualised agents.
2. Representing Agents
In examining the representation of agents, we are going to address three questions:
• What is it to represent agents?
• Why do we represent agents? (What’s the use of representing agents?)
• When do we represent agents in perception?7
6 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this valuable point.
7 The reason why we are focusing on perception (perceptual experience) rather than thought
is, firstly, because we are concerned with AVH, which is a perceptual experience. Secondly,
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2.1 What Is It to Represent Agents?
We might want to rephrase the question as: What is it to represent agents rather
than inanimate objects? We represent something as an agent when we represent it as
having an informational and a motivational profile (or perspective). Thus, we have
a grasp of the fact that it takes the world to be a certain way, and it can want the
world to be a certain way. Furthermore, and there is a question about whether this
is an additional step, we can be aware that this informational and/or motivational
profile can be different from our own. In other words, representing something as an
agent is to ascribe it ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’, where these words are used in the broadest
possible sense, where what an agent ‘believes’ is simply how it takes things to stand
in the world, and what an agent ‘desires’ is simply how that agent wants things to
be.8 This is often called ‘mindreading’. We will see that there is a narrower sense of
‘belief’ and ‘desire’ where these are taken to be more stable ‘mental states’.
2.2 Why Do We Represent Agents?
What is the use of representing agents? There are two different, but related uses. One
is to predict behaviour. The other is to understand others, and in particular to eval-
uate them, and hold them accountable. The former is adaptive in any multi-agent
context where it is important for an agent to be able to predict how other agents will
behave. Other agents could represent direct threats, insofar as they might attack you,
or they could be threats in a less direct sense, insofar as they compete for resources
(e.g. mates and food). Thus there might be some levels of deception going on, and
here emerges the demand for really quite sophisticated forms of higher-order min-
dreading (‘He thinks that I think that he thinks… ’). The latter, more normative
dimension of mindreading, is clearly adaptive in a society where social norms (posi-
tive and negative reactions to acceptable and unacceptable behaviours) are in place as
a way of enforcing pro-social behaviour. For simplicity, we focus on the predictive
dimension of agent representation, although the normative elements may well be
relevant to interesting features of voice-hearing (e.g. the sense of guilt or of being
judged).
Representing the informational and motivational profiles of others enables us to
predict their behaviour through a principle of rationality: we assume that agents
(crucially, not necessarily physical ones) will impact upon the world in the service
of their goals and take their information about the world into account as a way of
doing so. This prediction is achieved (at least in humans) at very different timescales.
Roughly speaking, it is useful to think of three different timescales at which
we predict the behaviour of other agents. From the smallest to the largest, these
we take this question to divide relevant empirical options in a way that agent representation in
thought doesn’t.
8 An important question in philosophy concerning whether intentions should be added to beliefs
and desires an irreducible mental state, or whether intention is reducible to desire andmeans-end
belief.
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are: (i) goal-directed bodily actions, (ii) beliefs, desires, intentions (in a narrower
sense that will become clearer) and (iii), personalities and preferences. What is inter-
esting is that at all three timescales, there is something like the principle of rational
action that guides our predictions, which is, as we mentioned, central to the very
concept of an agent (namely, that agents will take into account how they take things
to stand in the world and act accordingly in the service of their goals).
At the short timescale of goal-directed actions, the expectation is that action will,
first, have a purpose, and, second, be performed as efficiently as possible (Gergely and
Csibra, 2003; Jastorff et al., 2011). Within the class of short-timescale goal-directed
actions, it is vital not to overlook communicative actions, such as speech acts. When
someone speaks we naturally and intuitively pick up on their communicative inten-
tions, and when we speak we form various assumptions about how our commu-
nicative intentions will be picked up on by others.
At the middle-timescale we get predictions on the basis of beliefs and desires. Here
‘belief’ and ‘desire’ are not meant as the generic term for informational and moti-
vational profiles, but for something less stimulus-bound than perceptually-guided
goal-directed action, but still somewhat flexible (more flexible, as we will see, than
personality and preference). So, a belief, in this sense, is an informational state that an
agent has in various different contexts (contrast with the egocentric informational
state that you currently have that concerns your immediate surroundings). This kind
of state is supposed to be sensitive to counter-evidence, but should, for as long as
it lasts, guide actions across an agent’s life and in various different contexts. Thus, if
somebody believes that the Earth is flat, they will be reluctant to sail off into the dis-
tance. If somebody believes that certain mushrooms are poisonous, they will refrain
from eating them (and prevent the people they care about from eating them too).
At the largest timescale we predict on the basis of personalities and preferences.
These are less flexible in the face of contrary evidence, and they enable us to pre-
dict by thinking ‘What would John do here?’ There are two very different kinds of
representations that drive these predictions. They are: (1) singular representations,
and (2) generic representations. The former involves knowing a specific individ-
ual well enough to be able to attribute a personality to them. The latter involves
having a generic representation of a personality type, or even a social stereotype
(‘Loud-mouthed yuppie’), or even a specific occupation (‘A policeman’), and then
recognising that the person here encountered, potentially for the first time, is of that
kind. So you might reason: ‘Here is a policeman. How might a policeman behave
in these circumstances?’
However, the attribution of a personality to an agent is not sufficient to attribute
an identity to specific agents. The latter is what we examine in Section 3.
2.3 When Do We Represent Agents in Perception?
There are, roughly speaking, two options here. We might call these options ‘infer-
ential’ vs. ‘intuitive’ views. The inferential view is that we recognise that something
looks like an agent and we have learnt how agents behave. In the case of auditory
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experience, this would involve recognising that something sounds like an agent
(usually a human) and therefore must be an agent. The intuitive view is that agent
representations are very readily (and, in a sense, non-inferentially) deployed. In con-
trast to the inferential view, where this would make no sense, on the intuitive view,
it would be possible to experience something as an agent prior to being consciously
aware of any of its perceivable properties.
Let us make an important side point. Youmay disagree with our use of ‘inferential’
and ‘intuitive’. In particular, you might think of inferential as something that can
be very low-level. That is a terminological decision. The substantive question is
whether the perception, and representation, of agency receives rapid and specialized
processing and whether this has consequences for our understanding of AVHs. We
think that there are obvious reasons for thinking that it does, and that this makes
certain aspects of certain AVHs less mysterious.
2.3.1 Evolutionary Support: Adaptive Hyper-Active Agent Detection.
There is strong experimental and ethnographic evidence to suggest that humans have
evolved what Barrett (2004) calls a ‘hyperactive agency detection device’ (HADD).
Heider and Simmel (1944) used an animation with moving shapes and found that
people are strongly biased towards the attribution of intentional agency when the
perceptual data is ambiguous. Guthrie (1980) hypothesised the existence of hyperac-
tive agency detection, on the grounds that it would be highly adaptive; a false positive
being generally less costly than a false negative (viz. failing to detect an agent that is
there would statistically have graver consequences than mistakenly detecting an agent
that is not there). More recently, Atran and Norenzayan (2004) have claimed that
‘natural selection has trip-wired cognitive schema for agency detection in the face of
uncertainty’ (p. 720). Atran (2002) ties this closely to developmental work suggesting
an early propensity of humans to attribute agency. We present this sort of data now.
2.3.2 Developmental Support: Early Agency Attributions. Many exper-
iments show that infants from a very young age distinguish humans from
non-humans. From birth, infants demonstrably prefer to look at faces and follow
their movement (Morton and Johnson, 1991). Furthermore, they imitate the facial
and hand gestures of people (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977). Of course the ability to
discriminate humans from non-humans, firstly, doesn’t show that agent representa-
tion is going on, and, secondly, doesn’t say much about agent-representation in the
absence of recognizably human stimuli.
Nevertheless, by the time that infants are 9 months old, they certainly seem to
behave in ways that suggest they are attributing agency. They point and request things
from others (Bates et al. 1975; Butterworth and Grover 1988), and they guide and
alter their behaviour towards things based on the behaviours of others towards those
things (Meltzoff, 1995).
As for the attribution of agency to things in the absence of specifically human
stimuli, Gergely and Csibra (2003) found that 12-month-olds ascribed intentions
to dots that moved around in a ‘rational manner’. Johnson et al. (1998) presented
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novel objects to 12-month-olds, varying the morphology (where the target object
either had a face or not) and behaviour (where the behaviour was contingent or
non-contingent on the behaviour of the infant). They found that infants were willing
to follow the gaze of something that lacked a face, but which reacted contingently to
them. Indeed, there is a lot of evidence to suggest that infants can detect contingency
in the first weeks of life (Watson, 1972, 1979; Rovee-Collier et al., 1989).
Of course, early development of agent representation is only suggestive of it being
‘intuitive’ (or ‘hardwired’). What further suggests intuitive status is its incorrigibility
in the face of counter-evidence. Consider other intuitive processes, such as those
that give rise to visual illusions, such as the Müller-Lyer Illusion. In the Müller-Lyer
Illusion, two lines that are actually of the same length, look different lengths. What
makes this an intuitive process is that no amount of counter-evidence eliminates the
misleading percept. Even if you measure the lengths of the lines, and, on that basis,
come to believe that they are the same length, they will not cease to be experienced
as different lengths. The claim that agent representation is intuitive (or hardwired)
amounts to claiming that it should be incorrigible in a similar way.
If we take the very same objects used with infants, in Johnson et al. 1998, even at
their most convincing, they present ample evidence that they are not really agents.
As Johnson (2003, p. 553) puts it,
To an adult, it would clearly be an artifact made of synthetic materials with
an electromechanical noise generator and mechanically driven movement. If
despite this obvious counter-evidence, it elicited a psychological interpretation
in adults, the argument that agent recognition is grounded in a hardwired system
would be supported …
The parallels between the adult’s attributions and those found previously with
infants were striking. Adults used mentalistic language to describe the behaviour
in just those conditions that infants followed the object’s directional orientation
with their gaze. If the object had a face or if it was faceless, but interacted
contingently with another agent, adults described it as ‘wanting’ something,
‘looking’ for something, ‘trying’ to do something … If, however, it did not have
a face and acted only randomly, adults rarely if ever used mentalistic language
to describe its behaviour. This result held regardless of whether the object’s
behaviour was instantiated auditorily (via contingent or random beeping) or
visually (via contingent or random wiggling) (Johnson, 2003, p. 553).
So, the question is whether, in spite of beliefs to the contrary in adults, the ‘illusory
experience’ of agency remains. This strongly suggests that it does.
It is interesting that it is contingency of behaviour, rather than specific features of
the thing perceived, that plays a more important role in the attribution of agency.
Although we are not directly evaluating existing aetiologies, ones that take AVHs
to involve self-produced phenomena whose monitoring has gone awry could easily
suggest that the voice’s ‘behaviour’ is contingent on the subject’s agency, since it is
(unbeknownst to the subject) triggered by the subject’s agency.
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3. Representing Specific Agents
Now let’s move from agency generally, to the representation of specific agents. Again,
we ask the same three questions as before, but this time with regard to the represen-
tation of specific agents:
• What is it to represent specific agents?
• Why do we represent specific agents? (What’s the use of representing agents?)
• When do we represent specific agents in perception?
3.1 What Is It to Represent Specific Agents?
What we are talking about here is not just the representation of any agent with cur-
rent beliefs, desires and intentions, but of a specific, numerically unique individual.
Is this merely the representation of the personality? Is this just very fine-grained
mindreading or something different? We think that it is something fundamentally
different, but a vital component of healthy social cognition, of successful interaction
in a world that is populated by other agents that we encounter and re-encounter.
One way of seeing that this is fundamentally different, is to reflect on the correct-
ness conditions of representing another agent in perception. Judging ‘this is a’ when
encountering someone, is not rendered correct merely by the fact that this person
looks just like a, or even has a qualitatively identical personality. It is only rendered
correct by the fact that the person in question is a, namely, the very same indi-
vidual. Indeed it would be correct even if a had radically changed appearance and
personality.
What must be added to the capacity to attribute mental states and personalities in
order to get from the representation of agents to the representation of specific agents?
The answer to this, is an ability to re-identify or (to use a more technical term) ‘track’
individuals. In a paper that puts forward a ‘theory of integrated tracking’ Bullot
(2009) presents the example of Mary and her spouse George. Mary successfully
tracks George, ‘first as briefly located in her left visual field at t1, then as a voice
saying “goodbye” at t2, and eventually as somebody who has arrived back after a day
at work and can be perceived in a multimodal experience at t3’ (Bullot, 2009, p. 357).
In this case, Mary manages to activate her singular representation for George, the
individual, only when it is George who is indeed present. And this involves successful
re-identification, successful tracking.9
9 The point that representing personality and representing identity (a specific individual) are dif-
ferent can be put in logical terms. Personality is a predicate. It is something that can be said of
something (or ‘an individual’ in the bare, logical, sense). Thus two things can have the same
personality, and one thing can change its personality. An individual is not a predicate, it is some-
thing to which you attribute predicates. It is, in the formal language of first-order predicate logic,
re-identification is of the form ‘a= b’ not of the form ‘Fa’. Re-identifying a specific individual
is, therefore, not predicative. It involves drawing a link between two individuals, rather than
attributing a property to an individual.
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3.2 Why Do We Represent Specific Agents?
Why do we keep track of specific individuals? One might think that, like the repre-
sentation of agents generally, the purpose is to predict their behaviour. However,
the answer is a bit more nuanced than this. It is certainly true that successfully
re-identifying someone will enable us to predict their behaviour better. However,
that is only because we know their beliefs, desires, personalities and preferences,
and, short of any evidence to the contrary, we are bound to assume that these will
not have substantially changed. So tracking is very helpful for prediction, but only
when coupled with knowledge about the individual, namely, when coupled with the
attribution of mental states. Indeed it often tells us when to attribute those properties.
Perhaps one of the key survival functions is simply a matter of security. Associating
individuals with risks and being able to infer risk given a particular individual is likely
to be a key survival adaptation. One function that might be easy to overlook, and
which goes beyond sheer predictability, is the tracking of an individual over time,
regardless of how much they may have changed, so that we can reward of pun-
ish them for past deeds (‘score-settling’). Also, it enables us to remember common
ground with that individual, what experiences may have been shared, what infor-
mation would be old news to them and so on. Furthermore, from an evolutionary
standpoint, keeping track of individuals would have been extremely important for
‘in-grouping’ and ‘out-grouping’, as well of for maintaining a social hierarchy among
individuals.
It is also helpful for us to reflect on the sorts of individuals that we bother tracking
in this way. Among these are: other human beings that we are likely to re-encounter
(compared to those that we simply brush past on a crowded street), pets, perhaps a
very narrow set of inanimate objects that have particular emotional value. In other
words, we track things that have some significance to us as individuals, rather than
merely as the bearers of certain properties (e.g. where anything else with the relevant
property would do just as well—like knives in a drawer). Some of this ‘marking of
particularity’ (to use John Locke’s phrase) is aided by the very simple linguistic tool
of giving it a proper name. Although we haven’t the space to go into it here, it might
be informative to reflect on the function of giving names to the internally generated
identities we mentioned in Section 1.3.3.
3.3 When Do We Represent Specific Agents in Perception?
Under what conditions does someone perceive an individual as a previously encoun-
tered individual? More relevantly, one can view the same issue in terms of the
following question: Under what conditions—if at all—do judgements about iden-
tity override conflicting perceptual evidence? Again, as with the representation of
agents generally, we have an ‘inferential’ and an ‘intuitive’ option.
On the inferential option we ascribe properties to a currently perceived individ-
ual (the way they look, sound, act etc.) and match it to a previously encountered
individual. How a judgement about identity could then override conflicting percep-
tual evidence would have to be through some other non-perceptual evidence that
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outweighs it. For example, you might have evidence about an individual’s precise
location, or you might have been told that they have changed in such and such a
way. That way, you could judge that somebody is a certain person without looking
(or sounding, or smelling etc.) like that person.
For AVHs, such conflicting information will not be available. Hence (to echo
Cho and Wu, quoted above) the subject will represent, for example, her stepfather
because it sounds like her stepfather. Of course, then what needs to be explained is
how it is that the AVH experience comes to have those auditory qualities. That is
precisely the explanatory direction that we are trying to discourage in this article.
On the intuitive option, at least sometimes, a specific agent will be represented
without the subject having conscious access, either to any of the properties that
have grounded this, or to any other conflicting information (such as the location
of the individual). The claim is not that judgements of identity that are evidentially
grounded in appearance or personality, or spatiotemporal trajectory, never happen,
but rather that this is not the only way that they happen. Sometimes, and importantly,
these are intuitive. This would mean that sometimes, a judgement about identity
will override, or simply bypass, considerations about perceptual information. Why
would anyone hold such a view?
3.3.1 An Argument from Delusional Misidentification. One of us has
argued (Wilkinson, 2013) that delusional misidentification in the context of
traumatic brain injury is not to be understood (as the orthodoxy would have it)
as a response to evidence presented to the subject in experience, but rather as a
neural disruption to a tracking mechanism (which gives rise to an experience that
already carries the misidentification). This explains why, for example, the subject
with Capgras delusion, can (post hoc confabulated differences in appearance aside)
claim (i) that the person currently encountered (who is de facto their father) looks
exactly like their father, and (ii) they remember everything about their father. None
of the information-storage is impaired, nor is the information recall. Nor is there
anything wrong with the visual perception of faces. However, there seems to be a
problem with the sort of linking of information that constitutes successful tracking.
The upshot of this is that the subject is presented with someone who they are
certain is not their father, even though it looks just like their father (and they admit
this). The Fregoli delusion involves the opposite: the claim that a man who looks
nothing like the subject’s father is the subject’s father. Thus, the general lesson is
that some tracking (and, ultimately, some identity judgements) are not inferred on
the basis of properties.
Could something similar not apply to some AVHs? The representation of the
man who abused you as a child is the most active, the one you most fear. Thus, to
turn the standard explanatory order on its head: the voice has the properties that it
has because it is represented as the voice of a given individual, rather than the other
way around. For example, it is a deep, gruff voice, because it is represented as my
stepfather’s voice, rather than the other way around.
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3.3.2 Data from Dreams. Another reason to think that identity is something
that can be directly experienced, and needn’t be inferred from surface properties,
comes from dreams. Schwartz and Maquet (2002) compared the content of dream
reports with functional imaging during REM sleep (i.e. the sleep stage during which
vivid dreams are reported). The central idea is that, in principle, dream features can
be mapped onto specific distributions of brain activity. In dreams, it is common for
the perceived identity of an individual to come apart radically from the individual’s
appearance. Consider this dream report: ‘I had a talk with your colleague, but she
looked differently, much younger, like someone I went to school with, perhaps a
13-year-old girl.’ Or this one: ‘I recognize A’s sister [… ] I am surprised by her beard,
she looks much more like a man than a woman, with a big nose’ (both quoted in
Schwartz and Maquet, 2002, p. 26 and p. 29). This dissociation between how people
look and who they are taken to be, coupled with imaging results, shows, as Schwartz
and Maquet neatly put it,
… neuronal processes during sleep can simultaneously and independently engage
(1) unimodal visual areas underlying the internal generation of a perceptual rep-
resentation of an individual’s face [… ] and (2) distinct multimodal associative
areas in the temporal lobe responsible for triggering the retrieval of a familiar
individual’s identity (2002, p. 26, emphasis added).
To sum up then, it seems plausible that we can, at least sometimes, experience
someone as a specific individual in spite of explicit evidence that is either absent
or contrary to the fact.
4. Additional Explanatory Contributions to an Agent-based Approach to
AVH
Aside from giving a more faithful description of many AVHs, giving the represen-
tation of agents due attention has a number of potential explanatory payoffs. We
address the payoffs of considering the representation of agency generally, and then
the representation of specific agents.
4.1 Representation of Agency
If we grant that humans are deeply and innately social beings, and that the represen-
tation of agency plays a crucial role in human cognition, then this encourages us to
look for explanations at the level of factors that could impact on agent representation.
4.1.1 Integration with Delusions. Given the current scientific theories attempt
to explain the symptoms of psychosis, it is not clear a priori why both delusions and
auditory verbal hallucinations tend to have social content, as opposed to being about
any other aspect of the world. For example, in the case of delusions of control, the-
ories have focused on problems with the forward prediction of action as a potential
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explanation (Frith et al., 2000; Frith, 2012) although, in the vast majority of cases,
the symptom does not present solely as an experience of actions without intention
and without a sense of personal agency but typically involves the belief that they are
being controlled by outside agents. Fletcher and Frith (2009) argue for a Bayesian
approach to explaining psychotic symptoms within a predictive coding framework
that aims to account for delusions and hallucinations within a single model, but it
is still unable to explain why prediction errors most typically result in symptoms
with social content. As we have noted previously, agent representation seems to be
a core human ability that develops from a very early age, and may explain why
psychotic experiences are typically social in nature. In Bayesian terms, we have a
strong prior probability for interpreting things in terms of agency. Although we
have used a Bayesian account of psychotic symptoms as an example here, other
accounts—such as Langdon and Coltheart’s (1999) deficit account—are equally
compatible as ‘second factor’ reasoning. Such biases still need to account for why
delusions most commonly have social content.
4.1.2 Social Isolation. Social isolation usually refers to an objective lack of con-
tact with others. Several authors have noted that social isolation may lead to the
development of AVH (e.g. Beck and Rector, 2003; van Laarhoven, 1993) with Hoff-
man (2007) providing the most fully-developed account. His ‘social deafferentation
hypothesis’ proposes that a lack of social stimuli during critical windows in develop-
ment leads to changes in the brain regions that are associated with social cognition.
These changes are analogous to the neural changes observed in individuals who
experience ‘phantom limb’ following the loss of a body part. According to Hoff-
man, these changes can lead to the attribution of social meaning to non-meaningful
events (presumably ambiguous environmental stimuli, such as traffic noise, and inter-
nal events, such as inner speech). This erroneous attribution, argues Hoffman, forms
the basis of an AVH. Hoffman’s hypothesis has much in common with Beck and
Rector’s (2003) cognitive model of hallucinations. Beck and Rector argue that cog-
nitions are experienced as hallucinations when they pass a perceptual threshold.
They identify a number of factors that can make a cognition ‘hot’—such as being
emotionally charged—and so exceed the threshold, as well as a number of factors
that can reduce the threshold, and so make hallucinations more likely. In line with
Hoffman, one of the factors Beck and Rector identify as lowering the perceptual
threshold is social isolation.
Putting the emphasis on agent representation, rather than on general capacities of
social cognition, we could say that social isolation leads to a bias in the cognitive sys-
tem toward detecting agents amid non-agentive environment. On such a view, the
perceptual threshold that Beck and Rector (2003) talk about is not solely a lowered
threshold of sensory input, but also a lower threshold for the activation of agent rep-
resentations. This might lead to a heightened sensory phenomenology, but this would
be consistent with the agent representation being explanatorily prior. In other words,
you have the experience of someone talking to you because you have represented
an agent, rather than because you have a lowered threshold for auditory input.
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4.1.3 From Passivity to Alteriority. One aspect of AVHs that many mod-
els fail to account for is what might be called ‘alteriority’, namely, the sense that
the experience is caused by somebody else. Many theories can account for pas-
sivity (the ‘not me’ aspect of the experience) but cannot plausibly account for the
step from ‘not me’ to ‘somebody else’, that is, the step from passivity to alteriority.
Perhaps these theorists view alteriority as something that is inferred from passivity:
The subject reasons, ‘it’s not me, therefore it must be somebody else’. However, if
we view our basic propensity to represent agents as central to our understanding
of some AVHs, then alteriority is built in. Furthermore, this approach has more
explanatory potential than the approach where alteriority is inferred automatically
from passivity, since it can account for passivity experiences that aren’t attributed
to other agents, viz. that don’t involve alteriority. These phenomena would involve
experiences of passivity, but would not trigger (or involve, for whatever reason) our
natural propensity to represent agents. The feeling that, for example, an action is not
controlled by you will not, in itself, lead you to judge that it is being controlled by
somebody else.
4.2 Representation of Specific Agents
If we grant that the tracking of specific agents plays a fundamental role in human
cognition, then we get a better explanation of why so many auditory verbal
hallucinations are experienced as coming from particular agents. More specifically,
it might exempt us from having to claim that the agent’s identity is inferred from the
low-level properties of the auditory experience. As we’ve already noted, such a view
might claim that, in some cases of AVH, the auditory experience is phenomenolog-
ically the way it is because it involves the representation of a particular agent, rather
than the other way around, namely the notion that the agent is ‘built up’ from
auditory properties. One could further hypothesise that this is more likely to be the
case when the represented individual is especially significant to the subject (whether
for positive or negative reasons). For example, in cases of bereavement, the subject
often hears the voice of the deceased loved one (Keen et al., 2013). There are other
experiences, too, which are suggestive of a tracking-first view. For example, there
are cases where the presence of the deceased is felt, or footsteps of the deceased
are heard (in a way that the subject claims is unmistakably those of the deceased;
Carlsson and Nilsson, 2007). With a starkly different valence, voice-hearers
who were victims of childhood abuse can hear the voices of their abusers
(McCarthy-Jones, 2011).
In a related manner, there might be a connection between the agent represented
and the distressing nature of the voices. For example, Badcock and Chhabra (2013)
show, in a comparison between clinical and non-clinical voice-hearers, that the per-
ceived identity of the voice correlates strongly with the distress caused. Furthermore,
the fact that a history of childhood sexual and emotional abuse, but not physical
abuse, is linked to the likelihood of AVH, may suggest a connection with relationship
trauma (Bentall et al., 2012).
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5. Questions and Future Directions
The general shift in focus from the qualities of the experience to the representation
of agency also raises some interesting questions, and potential avenues for future
research. We examine these now.
5.1 Differences in Mindreading or Social Cognition
If the attribution of agency is central to some AVHs, what might this predict about
AVHs where the attribution of agency is impaired or different from the so-called
‘norm’? Are AVHs significantly or illustratively different in their frequency and/or
nature in, for example, autistic people or people with specific forms of brain injury?
It is worth noting here that we are suggesting that the ability to represent agency is
not the same as ‘theory of mind’ .We are arguing that theory of mind (the ability to
attribute mental states to others) is a higher-order function of successful agent rep-
resentation, as one has to first represent an individual agent to be able to attribute
beliefs, desires and intentions to it. However, we would expect that agent repre-
sentation problems are likely to ‘cascade up’ to theory of mind deficits. Bell (2013)
has argued for an agent-based approach to social cognition in which the representa-
tion of internal models of social actors are considered a key component, particularly
given the phenomenon of AVHs.
5.2 Ego-Distinctiveness and Agency Models
If agent representation is central to AVHs, then this raises potentially interesting
questions regarding ego-distinctiveness (to what extent the voice is experienced as
distinct from the voice-hearer’s own consciousness). On a pre-theoretical, inferential
view, the perceptual or semantic content of the voice might seem ego-distinct, even
radically and distressingly at odds with the intentions of the subject, and as a result
will be more likely to be attributed to another agent. However, given the centrality
of agent representation that we have been gesturing towards, the order of explana-
tion may be more complicated. Ego-distinctiveness may also reflect the extent to
which agency representation processes are affected in the voice-hearer. Indeed, there
are some clues from the clinical literature where need for care varies partly with
level of agency representation. For example, voice hearers with a need for clinical
care are more likely to attribute their voices to real people rather than non-corporeal
entities (Daalman et al., 2011) and they are also more likely to experience their
voices as ‘malevolent, omnipotent, intrusive, dominant, and coercive’ (Johns
et al., 2014).
5.3 Agency and the Perceived Reality of Voices
Finally, one might wonder how the representation of agency ties into epistemic
aspects, i.e. concerning the belief that the voices are real. Again, this can be separated
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into the generic representation of agency, and the representation of specific agency.
Thus one could explore whether subjects who attribute some (non-identity-specific)
agency are more likely to view their voices as real. Alternatively one could explore
whether subjects who represent specific agent identities (whether created or real)
are more likely to view their voices as real. Then, given an established relationship
between the perceived reality of the voices and (in negative voices) the extent to
which they are experienced as distressing or troubling, this could suggest potential
therapeutic avenues.
6. Conclusion
We have tried to shine the spotlight on an aspect of voice-hearing that has
either been overlooked entirely, or has not been given its due importance (both
descriptive, and explanatory). How different existing aetiologies can accommodate
agent representation in a way that lets it play the explanatory role that we have in
mind is an open question. However, it seems clear that, at first glance, the three
families of model that we mentioned earlier (inner speech-based, memory-based
and spontaneous activation models) have different prospects for being able to
do this. Memory-based models seem the best equipped to incorporate agent
representation in the relevant way, since memories are very often populated by
abstract multimodal agent representations. Conversely, spontaneous activation
models seem to be less well equipped, at least insofar as they currently appeal to
spontaneous activation in primary auditory cortex (Cho and Wu, 2013). How
well inner speech models fare in this regard will, in part, be determined by how
happy we are to accept that inner speech can involve representations of other
agents.10
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